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Situated Grounded Word Semantics 
Abstract 
The paper reports on experiments in which au-
tonomous visually grounded agents bootstrap 
an ontology and a shared lexicon without prior 
design nor other forms of human intervention. 
The agents do so while playing a particular lan-
guage game called the guessing game. We show 
that synonymy and polysemy arise as emergent 
properties in the language but also that there 
are tendencies to dampen it so as to make the 
language more coherent and thus more optimal 
from the viewpoints of communicative success, 
cognitive complexity, and learnability. 
1 Introduction 
The goal of studying natural language semantics is to 
determine the systematic relations between language ut-
terances, their meanings and their referents. Speakers 
must conceptualise reality to find an adequate mean-
ing, and they verbalise this meaning to yield an utter-
ance transmitted to the hearer. The hearer must inter-
pret the utterance to reconstruct the meaning and ap-
ply the meaning in this particular context to retrieve 
back the referent. One possible framework for study-
ing these relationships is the theory of formal (denota-
tional) semantics and its application to the treatment 
of natural language [Montague 79]. In this framework, 
functions are defined for mapping natural language ut-
terances into expressions in the predicate calculus (with 
suitable extensions) and for mapping logical expressions 
into their denotations. Such a framework has been the 
basis of much work in computational semantics and has 
been used to formalise the communication systems of 
autonomous agents. 
Although this formal approach has many virtues, it 
makes a number of simplifying assumptions which are 
not valid for physically grounded evolving autonomous 
agents that are part of inhomogeneous populations op-
erating in real world open environments. In such cir-
cumstances, it is first of all not possible to formalise 
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the model which acts as the domain of the denotational 
semantics. The physical environment produces an infi-
nite set of unforeseeable situations, independent of the 
agent and not delineatable by an outside observer. Be-
cause of the open-ended nature of the environment, the 
language cannot be designed (or pre-programmed) in 
advance but must expand or shrink to adapt to the 
changing task settings and evolving environments en-
countered by the agents. Second, the agents have to 
learn autonomously the language used in their commu-
nity, including its underlying ontology (the denotational 
semantics of the predicates). Consequently, it cannot be 
assumed that this language is uniform throughout the 
population. There are going to be different degrees of de-
tail in the different agents depending on the histories of 
interaction with the environment. Agents cannot inspect 
each other's brain states nor is there a central control-
ling agency that oversees additions to the language, so 
that polysemy (one meaning having different forms) and 
synonymy (one form having different meanings) are un-
avoidable. Finally, because the agents are situated and 
embodied in the environment, they must bootstrap their 
competence through strongly context and viewpoint de-
pendent cases. For example, something that is to the 
left for one agent may be on the right for another one 
depending on their respective positions, which makes it 
hard to learn the meanings of ieft ' and 'right'. 
We have been developing a framework for studying sit-
uated grounded semantics that does not make the sim-
plifying assumptions of classical formal semantics and 
is therefore more appropriate for studying human natu-
ral language communication or designing robotic agents. 
The framework consists of a theory on how agents could 
construct and acquire their individual ontologies, lexi-
cons and grammars, and of tools for studying the macro-
scopic properties of the collective ontologies, lexicons and 
grammars that emerge in the group. These and similar 
efforts have been reviewed in [Steels 97]. We are also con-
ducting experiments with physically instantiated robotic 
agents, both mobile robots moving around in their en-
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vironment with relatively weak sensors [SteelsVogt 97] 
and immobile robots with active vision [Steels 98]. The 
latter experimental infrastructure is used in the present 
paper and is known as the Talking Heads experiment. 
One of the major themes of our research is that lan-
guage can be studied as a complex adaptive system. 
The agents are carriers of individual linguistic knowl-
edge which becomes overt behavior in local interactions 
between agents. There is no central coordination nor 
access of one agent to the internal states of another. 
The local interactions shape and continuously reshape 
the language. The overall dynamics should exhibit cer-
tain emergent properties, which have been observed as 
universal tendencies in natural languages, such as the 
emergence of a globally coherent linguistic system or the 
damping of synonymy and polysemy. Given this broader 
framework, this research is strongly related to other ef-
forts to understand how autonomous grounded agents 
may build up their intelligence [SteelsBrooks 96], and 
particularly how they may bootstrap language [Hurford, 
et.al. 1988]. It draws on other research in the origins of 
complexity in natural systems [Langton 1995]. 
The rest of the paper first briefly introduces the Talk-
ing Heads experiment. Then general emergent proper-
ties of languages are reviewed. Next, results from experi-
ments in lexicon acquisition are shown and analysed with 
respect to the reaching of coherence and the damping of 
polysemy and synonymy. 
2 The Talking Heads experiment 
The experimental setup consists of two (possibly more) 
Sony EV1D31 pan-tilt cameras in which different agents 
can be loaded (figure 1). Agents can travel through the 
Internet and install themselves in robots in different loca-
tions. An agent can only interact with another one when 
it is physically instantiated in a body and thus perceive 
the shared environment. For the experiments to be re-
ported here, the shared environment consists of a mag-
netic white board on which various shapes are pasted: 
colored triangles, circles, rectangles, etc. The interac-
tion between agents takes the form of a language game, 
further called the guessing game. 
The guessing game 
The guessing game is played between two visually 
grounded agents. One agent plays the role of speaker 
and the other one then plays the role of hearer. Agents 
take turns playing games so all of them develop the ca-
pacity to be speaker or hearer. The objects located on 
the white board at the beginning of the game consti-
tute the context. Agents are capable of segmenting the 
perceived image into objects and of collecting various 
characteristics about each object, specifically the color 
(decomposed in RGB channels), grayscale, and position 
in pan/tilt coordinates. The speaker chooses one object 
Figure 1: Two Talking Head cameras and associated moni-
tors showing what each camera perceives. 
from the context, further called the topic, and gives a 
linguistic hint to the hearer. 
The linguistic hint is an expression that identifies the 
topic with respect to the other objects in the context. 
For example, if the context contains [1] a red square, [2] 
a blue triangle, and [3] a green circle, then the speaker 
may say something like "the red one" to identify [1] as 
the topic. If the context contains also a red triangle, 
he has to be more precise and say something like "the 
red square". Of course, the Talking Heads do not say 
"the red square" but use their own language and con-
cepts which are never going to be the same as those 
used in English. For example, they may say "malewina" 
to mean [UPPER EXTREME-LEFT LOW-REDNESS]. 
Due to space limitations, this paper only considers situa-
tions where the meaning consists of a single perceptually 
grounded category and the form consist of a single word. 
Based on the linguistic hint, the hearer tries to guess 
what topic the speaker has chosen, and he communicates 
his choice to the speaker by pointing to the object. A 
robot points by transmitting in which direction he is 
looking. The game succeeds if the topic guessed by the 
hearer is equal to the topic chosen by the speaker. The 
game fails if the guess was wrong or if the speaker or the 
hearer failed at some earlier point in the game. In case 
of a failure, the speaker gives an extra-linguistic hint by 
pointing to the topic he had in mind, and both agents try 
to repair their internal structures to be more successful 
in future games. 
The architecture of the agents has two components: 
a conceptualisation module responsible for categorising 
reality or for applying categories to find back the refer-
ent in the perceptual image, and a verbalisation module 
responsible for verbalising a conceptualisation or for in-
terpreting a form to reconstruct its meaning. Agents 
start with no prior designer-supplied ontology nor lexi-
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fore two synonyms and " tisame" is polysemous; it can 
meanboth [GRAY-0.0,0.25] and [HPOS-0.5,0.75]. Three 
words are used to refer to object- 1 This kind of situa-
tion is typical in certain stages of our experiments and 
complexity rapidly increases when the same meaning is 
also used to denote other referents (which is obviously 
very common and indeed desirable). 
As mentioned earlier, incoherence is not necessarily 
impinging on the communicative success of the language. 
The RMF-iandscape in 3 still leads to total success in 
communication whenever both meanings are equally ad-
equate for picking out the referent. Even if a speaker uses 
"tisame" to mean [GRAY-0.0,0.25] and the hearer under-
stands "tisame" to mean [HPOS-0.5,0.75], they still have 
communicative success. The goal of the language game 
is to find the referent. It does not matter whether the 
meanings are the same. The agents cannot even know 
this because they have no access to each other's brain 
states. 
The degree of coherence of a language can be mea-
sured by observing the actual linguistic behavior of the 
agents while they play language games, more specifically, 
by collecting data on the frequency of co-occurrence of 
items such as the possible forms of a certain referent or 
all the possible meanings for a certain form. The rela-
tions are represented in competition diagrams, such as 
the RF-diagram in figure 5, which plots the evolution of 
the frequency of use of the Referent-Form relations for 
a given referent in a series of games. One co-occurrence 
relation will be most frequent, and this is taken as an 
indication how coherent the community's language sys-
tem is along the dimension of the relation investigated. 
For example, if a particular meaning has only one form, 
then the frequency of that form in the MF-diagram will 
be 1.0, which means that there are no synonyms. 
The remainder of this paper now looks at a partic-
ular case study performed with the Talking Heads as 
currently operational. To allow this investigation, we re-
strict the set of possible referents (by keeping the en-
vironment constant) so that we can indeed track the 
grounded semantic dynamics forming and deforming the 
semiotic landscape. 
4 Damping synonymy and polysemy 
Figure 4 shows typical results for an experiment in which 
20 agents start from scratch to build a new communi-
cation system, both the ontology, by the growing and 
pruning of discrimination trees, and the lexicon, by cre-
ating new words and adopting them from each other. As 
communicative success is reached, there is an evolution 
towards a unique form for each referent, as illustrated in 
figure 5. This is expected because the agents get explicit 
feedback only about this relation, not about any other 
one. This diagram shows that there must be a damping 
Figure 4: This graph shows the average success per 200 
games in a series of 5000 games played by 20 agents. 
The agents evolve towards total success in their com-
munication after about 1000 games. A change in the 
environment induced after 3000 games gives a decrease 
in average success which rebounds quickly. 
Figure 5: This RF-diagram shows the frequency of each 
referent-form co-occurrence in 3000 language games for 
a single referent. One word "va" comes to dominate. 
of synonymy as well (and it is even clearer if we look at 
the RM-diagram). 
When we inspect the different meanings of "va", 
through the FM-diagram (figure 6), we clearly see that 
even after 3000 games polysemy stays in the language. 
Three stable meanings for "va" have emerged: [RED-
0,0.125], [BLUE-0.3125,0.3125], and [VPOS-0.25,0.5]. 
They are all equally good for distinguishing the topic 
"va" designates, and there are no situations yet that 
would have allowed disentanglement. 
In game 3000, the environment produces a scene in 
which a category which was distinctive for the object 
designated by "va" is no longer distinctive. More pre-
cisely, we, as experimenters, have moved the object very 
close to another object so that the position is no longer 
distinctive. Figure 4 shows first of all that success drops 
(meaning there have been some failures in the game), 
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Figure 6: This FM-diagram shows the frequency of each 
form-meaning co-occurrence for " va" in a series of 5000 
games. A disentangling situation arises in game 3000 
causing the loss of one meaning of "va". 
but that it rebounds quickly. The agent's language and 
ontology is adaptive. What has happened is that a large 
part of the agents still keep using " va", because the color-
based categories are still applicable. But "va" no longer 
picks out the right object for those who believe that "va" 
means [VPOS-0.25,0.5], so they have to learn an alter-
native meaning for "va", compatible with the new situ-
ation. The FM-diagram in figure 6 shows that the po-
sitional meaning of "va" (namely [VPOS-0.25,0.5]) has 
disappeared. The other meanings, based on color, are 
still possible because they are not affected when the ob-
ject designated by "va" moved its position. 
This case study illustrates the main points of the pa-
per. The overt selectionist force on the language sys-
tem is success in the game, which is maximised if the 
agents use the same word for designating the same ref-
erent (in the same context). This does not in itself im-
ply that there are no synonyms nor polysemy because 
agents could prefer different words which they mutually 
know from each other and they could associate differ-
ent meanings with a certain word which are nevertheless 
compatible with the environments they have seen. We 
have shown that nevertheless damping of synonymy and 
polysemy occurs. Synonymy is damped because of the 
lateral inhibition of alternatives in lexicon use. This cre-
ates a positive feedback loop in which words that have 
a slight advantage will further gain in a winner-take-all 
process. Polysemy is damped because there are situa-
tions disentangling incoherent form-meaning relations. 
5 Conclusions 
The construction and acquisition of grounded languages 
poses specific difficulties for autonomous agents, causing 
their languages to exhibit partial incoherence. Agents 
have to develop their own categories for approaching 
their world, and they cannot know which meaning has 
been intended by a speaker, even if they know the ref-
erent through extra-linguistic means. We have shown 
that a particular agent architecture can achieve the boot-
strapping of a language system from scratch and that the 
collective dynamics it generates dampens synonymy and 
polysemy. 
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